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hallowed task of legal reform in the right spirit, if we approach it
not rashly but reverently-without pride or prejudice-free alike
from the prejudice that clings to everything that is old, and turns
away from all improvement; and from the pride of opinion, that,
wrapped in fancied wisdom, disdains to profit either by the experience of our own times or the recorded knowledge of past generations :" Yerplanck's Speech in N. Y. Senate, p. 30 and 31.
T.B.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme JudiciaZ Court of Maine.
SARAH M. PIPER V8. CHARLES D. GILMORE.
Certain notes payable to A. were by him deposited with B., in pledge as security
-for his indebtedness to B. C., being desirous of collecting a claim of his own
against A., made inquiries of B. as tothe notes; and B., without being informed
of the purpose of the inquiry, replied that the notes belonged to A.:-Held, that,
without proof that B. intended to deceive C. to his injury, these facts do not
operate as an estoppel in pais, to prevent B. claiming money paid to him on the
notes, notwithstanding the money was attached and seized by C. at the time of
payment.
In such a case, in order that B. should be estopped from setting up a title to the
money, it must be shown that he wilfully gave false information to C., with an
intention to deceive him, and to induce him, on the faith of it, to act in a different manner than he otherwise would have done, whereby -C. was led to
change his action, and was thereby injured.

TRESPASS against the defendant as sheriff of Penobscot county,
to recover damages for his taking $290 in specie, alleged to be the
property of the plaintiff. Plea the gdieral issue, with a brief
statement justifying the taking of the money as the property of
Mark W. Piper, by virtue of a writ of attachment in favor of Henry
Pendexter, against Mark W. Piper and Martin V. B. Piper. The
action, Pendexter vs. Piper, was entered and prosecuted to judgment, and the $290 applied to satisfy the execution.
In July, 1854, Pendexter, having bought a farm of Mark W.
Piper and Martin V. B. Piper., gave them his notes for $800, and
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a mortgage of the farm as security. The notes not having been
paid, the mortgagees gave notice of their intention to foreclose it.
May 19, 1856, Martin assigned his interest in the notes and mortgage to the plaintiff.
There was evidence tending to show that Mark was, at the time
of Martin's assignment, indebted to the plaintiff, $425 and interest;
that Martin delivered Mark's share of the notes and mortgage to
the plaintiff, Mark being then in New York; that, on his return
to Kenduskeag in 1857, he obtained further advances of the plaintiff, and agreed with her that she might hold the notes and mortgage as security.
In 1858, R. S. Prescott, agent of Pendexter, and of the owner
of the equity of redemption in the farm, asked the plaintiff if Mark
owned half of the notes. She replied that he did: that she " had
no control so as to allow for the oats, on Mark's part, but no doubt
Mark would do what was right."
Soon afterwards, Prescott caused the writ in Pendexter vs. Pipvr
al. to be made and delivered to an officer, and when Pendexter
paid his mortgage-notes, the officer attempted to seize the specie,
and succeeded, after a struggle, in securing $290, the plaintiff retaining the balance.
There was evidence that Mark W. Piper at the time owned real
estate in Kenduskeag, which the officer did not attach.
CUTTING, J., presiding, instructed the jury, that if the plaintiff
told the agent of Pendexter that Mark owned half of the. notes
and mortgage, and he was deceived by such declarations, whatever

the knowledge or intention of the plaintiff, and attached the specie
on the strength of such declaration, and was thereby injured, the
plaintiff could not be allowed to claim title to the money attached.
And if Mark had other property which could have been attached
by Pendexter, and he was deceived by the plaintiff's declarations,
and did not attach such property, the jury might consider whether
this was an injury to Pendexter.
It did not appear that Mark or Martin was insolvent at the time,
nor that the plaintiff knew that Pendexter was about to attach the
money, or made any claim to the notes or money, or was about to
commence or had commenced a suit.

PIPER vs. GILMORE.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The presiding
judge inquired of them, to whom they found the money belonged.
and they replied that they did not consider that question.
The plaintiff filed exceptions to the instructions of the Court.
.MfcCrillis & Mace, for the plaintiff.
Rowe & Bartlett, for the defendant, argued that if the attachment was induced by the plaintiff's representations, she could not
maintain an action for damages arising from it. Rangely vs. Apring,
21 Maine 130 ; Batch vs. Kimball, 16 Maine 146 ; 1 Story's Equity, § § 385, 887, 890.
Declarations made by one party, and acted upon by the other,
and his action thereby changed to his injury, operate in the way
of estoppel upon the party making them. -Dewey vs. Field, 4 Met.
881; Stone vs. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 844; Harding vs. Carter, cited
by Parke on Ins. 4; Chapman vs. Searles, 8 Pick. 38; Heame vs.
Rogers, 8 Barn. & Cress. 577 ; Lewiston Falls Bank vs. Leonard,
43 Maine 344.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MAY, J.-In determining the correctness of the instructions
complained of, we may, with propriety, assume that the notes,
upon which the money attached by the defendant's. deputy was
paid to the plaintiff, were, as against Mark W. Piper, rightfully
held by her as security for his liabilities. She seems to have held
his share as a pledge for that purpose. The testimony shows that,
while she so held them, Prescott, the agent of the attaching creditor, and of the owner of the equity of redemption in the premises
mortgaged to secure said notes, called upon her and inquired " if
Mark W. Piper owned half -the notes;" and she replied that " she
had bought Martin's part, and that Mark's part of the mortgaged
notes was his. She had no control, so as to allow for the oats, on
Mark's part. No doubt he would do what was right."
She does not appear to have been. apprised of the agency of
Prescott, nor of any desire on his part to make an attachment to
secure the demand of Henry Pendexter, his principal, which was
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afterwards put in suit. The notes were not attachable, and there
is no evidence that she then knew that payment of the notes would
soon be made, if made at all. At this time, Mark W. Piper was
the general owner of his half therein, and, if not paid, the loss
would fall upon him. There had been no written assignment of
his part to the plaintiff. Her title to them was but an equitable
.title, but the money due upon them when paid, according to tho
arrangement of the parties, would become hers. The receipt of it
would so far operate as a payment of her debt against Mark. She
did not say that the money, when paid, would not be hers.
Strictly speaking, therefore, there was no falsehood in the statement that " Mark's part of the mortgaged notes was his."
Under these circumstances, the jury was instructed c that if the
plaintiff told the agent.of Pendexter that Mark owned one-half of
the notes and mortgage, as testified to, and he was deceived by
such declarations, whatever the knowledge or intention of the
plaintiff, and attached the specie on the strength of such declarations, and has been thereby injured, the plaintiff could not now be
allowed to claim title to the money attached." This instruction
makes the knowledge and intentions of the plaintiff touching her
statements wholly immaterial. By it, she is estopped from showing
the honesty of her purposes, the truth of her statements, or her
ignorance of the purposes, wishes, or rights of the attaching
creditor. Is such an instruction in conformity with the law?
Estoppels in pais are created by the law for the purpose of doing
justice. They are called equitable estoppels, in contradistinction
to'an estoppel by a deed or record. Whether they exist in specific cases is often a question of great difficulty. The rules of law in
regard to them seem to be well established. They may arise from
a variety of facts, and often depend in a great degree upon the relations which exist between the parties. The general rule of 'law
in regard to them, in England and this country, is, that i a party
will be concluded from denying his own acts or admissions, which
we're expre8ly de8igned to influence the conduct of another, and
did so influence it, and when such denial will operate to the injury
of another." Cumming8, adm'r.-, vs. Webster, 43 Maine 192;
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Rangely vs. Spring, 21 Id. 130; Wallis vs. Truesdell, 6 Pick. 455;
Welland Canal Co. vs. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 430. The rule, as
laid down in Pickford vs. Sears J- al., 6 Ad. & Ellis 469, is, that
f6where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to
believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and induces
him to act on that belief, or to alter his own previous position, the
former is concluded from averring against the latter a different
state of things, as existing at the same time." In all the cases
where an estoppel has been held to exist, it is believed that it will
appear, upon examination, that there was some evidence tending
to show that the party estopped had some knowledge of the rights,
interests, or intentions of the other party, or of his relations to
the thing to which his declarations or acts related; or, that he
had some intention of misleading the other party into some action
that might be prejudicial io him. In every case there will be
found some degree of bad faith, either expressly designed or constructive. The authorities, wherever the question has been raised,
most, if not all of them, agree that the declarations or conduct
must have been wilful in order to have the estoppel attach.
What is meant by the term wilful is well determined, not only
in England but in our own state. In the case of Freeman vs.
Cooke, 6 Dowl. & L. 187, and 2 Exch. 654, it was decided that
unless the statement was intended to induce the other. party to act
on the faith of it, or was such that a reasonable person would act
upon the faith of it, believing that it was intended by the party
making it that he should so act, no estoppel would be created, notwithstanding the other party did in fact believe the statement, and
was induced to alter his position accordingly. See Harrison's Dig.
vol. 7, p. 614, Phila. ed., and cases there cited. The rule upon
this point is, that whatever a man's real meaning may have been,
he 'must so conduct himself that a reasonable man would take the
representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he
should act upon it, or the party making the representation will not
be precluded from contesting its truth. Such is also the settled
law of Connecticut. Taylor & al. vs. .Ely & al., 25 Conn. 250;
Preston vs. Mann d6 al., Id. 118.
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In comdenting upon the general rule in regard to estoppels in
pais, as laid down in Pickard vs. Sears & al., before cited, WHITMAN, 0. J., in the case of Gopeland vs. Copeland, 28 Maine 525,
remarks, that "cin the position thus established, it must be observed that several things are essential to be made out in order to
the operation of the rule; the first is, that the act or declaration
of the person must be wilful, that is, with knowledge of the facts
upon which any right he may have must depend, or with an intention to deceive the other party; he must, at least, it would seem,
be aware that he is giving countenance to the alteration of the conduct of the other, whereby he will be injured ifthe representation
be untrue."
In the case of Horton, adm'r., vs. ffodgdon, $2 Maine 127, it
is said by WELLs, J., in the opinion concurred in by the' Court,
that, "cbefore one can be conclusively bound by a declaration made
in relation to his interest in property, such declaration must be
designed to influence ihe conduct of the person to whom it is'addressed, and must have that effect." The facts in this case will be
found to be not very dissimilar fron the present case. The declilration there relied on was held not to have bee wilful, becauie it
appeared tlat the party making it did not know that the other
party had any demand against Clark, nor that he needed or *had
any occasion for infornation on the subject. The' same learned
Judge, in Sullivan vs. Parks, 33 Maine 438, says, in delivering
the opinion of the Court, that, "the declarations of a party,.which
should estop him, as to a third persoii, must be made to one who
has a right 'to know the relations of the party to the property in
question; if made only to a person having no 'such right, they
would not necessarily create an estoppel."
In the case before us, the limitation or qualification of the
general rule, relating to estoppels in pais, as shown by the preceding authorities, seems to have been overlooked; and the instructions given, being in direct conflict with such limitation or
qualification, are manifestly erroneous. It becomes unnecessary
to consider the other instructions.
Exceptions sustained.
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TENNEY,
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0. J., RIcE,

APPLETON,

CUTTING,

and

KENT, JJ.,

concurred.
We are indebted to the courtesy of
Mr. Justice MAY for the foregoing opinion. It comes so precisely into the line
of argument which we adopted in the
note to the case of Insurance Co. v.
Brooks, in our May number, that we
shall not, perhaps, be expected to add
much to what we there said upon the
precise point of the ground of estoppels
inpai '.
We have long been impressed with the
wonderful advance made by the American courts in the last thirty years, in
giving a conclusive effect to estoppels
of all kinds. As long ago as the case
of Isaacs v. Clark, 12 Vt. R. 692 (1889),
the doctrine of estoppels was so lame
and so unsettled that we found a decided reluctance in the court about enforcing the rule against the party who
had once tried the same question between
the same parties, on the ground that the
verdict passed upon an incidental and
collateral question in the former cause:
and that the finding of the jury was not
placed upon the record, and could not,
therefore, be pleaded as an estoppel of
record. But the ultimate decision was
in favor of the estoppel, at which we
felt some gratification, regarding it as
an advance in the right direction.
We reviewed the whole ground in
Gray v. Pingrey, 17 Vt. R. 419, and
attempted to define the proper distinction between pleading estoppels and
giving them in evidence before the jury,
and the comparative conclusiveness of
the one or the other mode of urging the
same. It seemed to us that this last
case carried the doctrine of estoppels
of record to the utmost verge, the very*
Ultima Thule of the law upon that point,
at that time. But it has already ad-

vanced far beyond the point there
assumed. We do not desire to bring in
question the doctrine of estoppels of
record. But we have always regarded
the rule of law by which a former verdiet is made to apply, as an estoppel,
upon matters and questions not defined
upon the record, and which cannot be
determined in any after proceeding
without resort to parol proof, involving
an inquiry into the deliberations of the
jury-room, as having carried this doctrine quite up to the extreme line of
safety. We should regard estoppels of
this character as not a little odious, in
the language of the old books.
On the other hand, while the doctrine
ofestoppels of record has been advancing
to greater stringency- that of estoppels
in pais has been constantly relaxing of
late. It was at one time supposed that
if a party inquired of by a mere intruder, denied his intercst in any subject-matter of the inquiry, he was for
ever estopped from setting up such
interest, not only against the party inquiring, but as to all other parties to
whom such denial had been communicated. But this broad rule is clearly
not maintainable. The only just basis
of estoppels in pais is good faith and
fair dealing. It is now clearly settled
that the disclaimer, to become binding
upon the party, must be made to one
bon& fide seeking information for the
protection of his rights, and that he
must have. acted upon it before it will
become binding upon the party making
it: Downs v. Flint, 28 Vt. R. 527; or
else the party must stand by and see
another party purchase the property to
which he claims title, upon the belief
that he is acquiring full title: Miller v
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Bingham, 29 Vt. R. 82. No party is the expectation upon which he did the
estopped by a declaration made in igno- act, may insist upon such fulfilment;
rance of his rights: Thrall v. Lothrop, and equally if he has omitted to do any
80 Vt. R. 807. The declaration must act, trusting to the assurance of some
be made with the intent to lead another other thus given, and which omission
to believe the person making the decla- will be prejudicial to him; if the assuration will assert no claim, and it must rance is not made good, he may insist
thus mislead the other to his detriment: it shall be made good." From the reWhite v. Langdon, 80 Vt. R. 599. After cent English case of Swan v. The Nort .
considerable discussion and reflection in British Australasian Company, 10 Jur.
Strong v. Ellsworth, 26 Vt. R. 366, the N. S. 102 (1864), in the Exchequer
rule was thus declared: "He who by his Chamber, itwouldseem that carelessness,
words, or his actions, or his silence even, to amount to an estoppel upon the party,
intentionally or carelessly induces an- as to asserting the truth in his favor.
other to do an act, which he would not must be what the law denominates
otherwise have done, and which will criminal or culpable, crassa negligentia.
prove injurious to him if he is not alI. F. R.
lowed to insist .upon the fulfilment of

Supreme "ourtof Pennsylvania.
SCHOLLENBERGER VS.

BRINTON.

The sum agreed in a- ground-rent deed to be paid for the extinguishment of the
ground-rent is not an estate, but a debt when the owner of the land has elected
to pay it.
The clause for the extinguishment of the rent on payment of a certain sum, does
not make the contract a mere offer to sell hereafter on certain conditions, but a
present and complete sale with an alternative mode of payment at the option of
the grantee.
Therefore where a ground-rent is payable by ther terms of the deed, in "lawful
ilver money of the United States," and there is a clause of extinguishment on
the payment of a certain sum "lawful money, as aforesaid ;" the latter is payable in legal tender notes of the United States.

At Nisi Prius, May 1864, the opinion of the Court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-This is a demurrer to the complainant's bill, brought
for pecific performance, to compel the defendant to execute a
release and extinguishment of a ground-rent. The defendanit sold
to John McDowell, whose title complainant owns, a lot in Phila.
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delphia, upon a ground-rent of $211.50, payable half-yearly in
-lawful silver money of the United States of America." The
deed contains the following clause of redemption:
cc Provided always, nevertheless, that if the said John McDowell,
or his heirs or assigns, shall and do at any time hereafter, pay or
cause to be paid unto the said Mary M. Brinton, her heirs or
assigns, the sum of three thousand five hundred and twenty-five
dollars lawful money as aforesaid, and the arrearages of said
yearly rent to the time of such payment, then the same shall for
ever thereafter cease and be extinguished, and the covenant for
the payment thereof shall become void, and then the said Mary
M. Brinton, her heirs and assigns, shall and will, at the proper
costs and charges in the law of the said grantee his heirs or
assigns, seal, and. execute a sufficient release and discharge of the
said yearly rent, hereby reserved to the said John McDowell and
his heirs and assigns for ever, anything hereinbefore contained to
the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding."
The complainant tendered to the defendant the sum required
to extinguish the ground-rent in legal tender notes of the United
States, which the defendant declined to accept, and the point
raised by the demurrer is, that the tender was insufficient, because
not made in current silver money of the United States.
The question of the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act
was raised in the argument, and the case rested on the grounds
that .the subject of payment was not a debt, but an estate subject
to redemption only on stipulated terms, and that the owner of the
rent only bargained that the owner of the land m i7ht buy it off
upon fixed terms.
I think neither of these positions is. correct. The sum which
was agreed to be paid in extinguishment of the rent is not an
estate, when the owner of the land elects to pay it. The mistake
is in confounding the value of the interest or estate which the
owner of the ground-rent has in the ground-rent with the price or
sum to be paid to extinguish it. Unquestionably, the interest of the
ground-rent owner is really subject tb descent, to execution, and
to alienation as real estate, but the money which the purchaser of
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the land agreed to pay is the price or consideration of the estate of
the ground-rent owner paid to extinguish it.
What was the transaction ? The ground-rent owner was the owner
of the land. He agreed to sell it to the purchaser for an alternative consideration, to wit : the interest of the price, $211.50, payable annually for ever if the purchaser chooses so to pay; or, when
he elects, the price itself, $3525. The consideration is, therefore, $211.50 annually, or $3525 when the purchaser chooses so
to pay it. When the deed was made, the case then stood tihus: The
grantee became vested with a freehold of inheritance in the land,
and the grantor with an incorporeal hereditament in the rent, subject by the.-terms of the conveyance itself (not a new bargain), to
be divested by the payment of the price in the alternative form
after election.
Thus, a simple analysis of the transaction shows that the purchaser, when he elects to pay the principal, does no more than
pay the price set upon the property by the terms of the original
bargain, and that at the moment when he makes his election to
cease paying the annual price and buy the principal, he has made
it a debt; that is, a specific sum of money, which, by the deed,
he owes, and agrees to pay when he elects to do so.
What he pays is not an estate, but it is that which he pays for the
estate. It is money, it is specific and certain, and it is that which
he has agreed by express terms to pay to extinguish the estate of
the ground-rent owner. What is this but a debt? In what does it
differ from any other contract where an option or election is given
to the buyer ? Suppose the subject of sale to be a chattel instead
of land, and the purchaser agrees to pay the annual interest of
the price for ever, or, at his option, to pay the principal, does the
want of power in the vendor to compel him to make his election to
pay the principal change the character of the principal as a debt
when he does elect to pay it ? How is this case any different ?
If the ground-rent owner cannot enforce payment of the principal,
it is not because the money, when offered to be paid, is not of the
nature of a debt, but because he has given his grantee an option
to pay in either way. It is his deed or contract which prevents
VoL. XIL-88
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the exaction, not the nature of the sum to be paid. It is a suma
of money arising in contract ; it is the price of an estate; it is
paid to extinguish it; and it is certain and fixed. If this be not a
debt, what is?
The other objection is not more sound, that the owner of th&
ground-rent only bargained that he would sell on stipulated terms.
The idea, as I understand it, is this : That by the terms of this
clause the owner of the ground-rent offers to sell the ground-rent
to the grantee upon his paying to the former so many dollars in
,Olver money, and that until the grantee comes to his terms he is
not bound by the offer; but it is an unaccepted proposition until
the grantee comes up to his terms of silver money. This is fallacious. The redemption clause is not a contract for a future sale
of the ground-rent, but is a provision for the cessation and extinguishment of the ground-rent when the stipulated price, the sum
already agreed upon for the purchase, shall be paid. It is a proviso that when the sum is paid, with arrears of the yearly rent,
"9then the same (to wit, yearly rent) shall for ever thereafter cease
and be extingui8sied, and the covenant for the payment thereof
shall become void." It was, therefore, not an offer to se1l but the
sale had been made, the deed was its execution, and the clauses
merely provided for the alternative mode of payment. This will
be the more manifest from the nature of the deed. It conveys the
land for the nominal consideration of one dollar, a present valuable
consideration introduced to give the deed the legal effect of a feoffment, or deed with livery of seisin. But the real consideration
is the covenant of the grantee to pay the annual interest or rent;
or, when he so elects, the stipulated price in full; and the grantor
presently covenants in the deed that the payment, when made,
shall extinguish the covenant to pay rent. The instrument is operative at the time of its date, and needs no new act of the grantor
to give it effect.
It is because the grantee so provided and covenanted in the deed
itself that extinguishment takes place. It is true the deed provides
for a release and discharge of the yearly rent; but this, it is
nanifest, was but to preserve the evidence, and provide for a clean
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record; so that the registry which shows the charge should also
8how the discharge. The operative act is the payment. There
can be no doubt that payment in itself discharges the rent, and if
the ground-rent owner should die the next moment, the evidence
of the payment would be all sufficient for the owner of the land;
and the reason is, that this is the provision of thedeed itself. On
payment being made, the language is-" Then the same (rent)
shall for ever thereafter cease and become extinguished."
It follows from these considerations that the demurrer is not well
taken. It must be overruled, and the defendant is ordered to
answer the bill within thirty days from the filing of the order.

Court of Appeals of New York.
LUDLAM, EXECUTRIX, VS. LUDLAM et

at.

In the absence of any law of the United States governing the particular case, the
question whetlier one born out of the United States is a citizen, is to be determined by the common law, as it existed, irrespective of English statutes, at the
adoption of the Federal Constitution.
At common law, the duty of allegiance and the rights of citizenship passed by descent, the child following the condition of the father; so that if a father out of
the realm was within the allegiance of the king, his child by an alien wife was
born a subject to the British crown.
The statute (26 Edw. III., h. 2) upon. this point, is a declaratory, and not an enabling act.
Whether a citizen is capable of renouncing his allegiance without the consent of
his government, or may when his government has not prohibited it, quxre.
But if he may, he cannot divest himself of his citizenship until he becomes the
citizen of another government, and this he cannot do until he arrives at full
age.
Held, accordingly, that where a citizen of the United States went to Peru at the
age of eighteen years, with the intention of indefinite continuance there for the
purpose of trading, but took no steps to be naturalized in Peru, or to indicate
an intention of a permanent change of domicil, otherwise than as before stated.
his child born to him in Peru of a wife the native of that country, is a citizen
of the United States.
A finding as of a fact, that the father voluntarily "expatriated" himself, with the
intention of becoming a permanent resident of Peru, regarded as immaterial.
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Such a child may, it seems, be subject to a double allegiance, and upon arriving
at his majority may elect to retain the one and repudiate the other, but until
such election he retains all the rights of citizenship in both countries, though
discharging its duties in but one.

Appeal from the Supreme Court. The original plaintiff, Anna
R. Ludlam, and the defendant Maximo M. Ludlam, were the only
children of Richard L. Ludlam, who died at New York in April,
1838, when the said Anna R. was less than one, and her brother
Maximo less than seven years of age. The other defendants were
the testamentary guardians of the said Anna R. and Maximo M.
during their minority. As such, they had received the price of
certain lands in the city of New York belonging to said infants, as
heirs of an uncle, and which were sold by order of the Supreme
Court. Soon after her arrival at the age of twenty-one years, Anna
R. Ludlam commenced this action in the Supreme Court against
the testamentary guardians and her brother Maximo, claiming the
whole of the proceeds of the land, on the ground that her brother,
having been born in Peru, South America, was an alien, incapable
of inheriting real estate in this state, and that she was the sole
heiress at law of her deceased uncle. Maximo, answered the complaint, claiming that he was, at the time of his uncle's decease, a
citizen of the United States, capable of inheriting real estate, and
that, on the death of their uncle, he and the plaintiff became seised,
as tenants in common, of one-sixth part of the lands whereof such
uncle died seised, subject to the life estate of Rebecca Ludlam, and
that each was entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the sale thereof, then in the hands of the testamentary guardians. The guardians admitted the facts stated in the complaint, except as to the
respective rights of the plaintiff and Mkximo Ludlam, and prayed
for the direction of the court in that respect. The cause was tried
at the Kings County Circuit in July, 1859, before Mr. Justice
LOTT, without a jury.
It was proved on the trial that Richard
L. Ludlam was .born in this country in the year 1804; that he
left the country in the year 1822, "for the purpose of seeking employment and bettering his condition," his intention being to go
to Cadiz, and thence to Lima, in Peru; that he made a direct
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passage, and arrived in Peru a few months after leaving the
United States, where he remained until November, 1836, when he
left on his return to New York, where he arrived in April, 1837,
in poor health, and died in April, 1838. In 1828, at Lima, he
married the present plaintiff, who Was a native of Chili, but had
removed in childhood to Peru, and had afterwards remained there.
The only children of this marriage, except such as died in infancy
in this country and in Peru, are the defendant, Maximo M. Ludlam, who was born at Lima in November, 1831, and the original
plaintiff in this action, Anna R. Ludlam, who was born in New
York in December, 1837. There was no evidence showing the
object or design of Richard L. Ludlam in leaving this country,
beyond what is above stated, or that he ever took any steps to
become a citizen of any other country. It appeared that after
his arrival at Lima, he acted as a clerk until about the time of his
marriage, when he went into business on his own account as a
tobacco merchant, in copartnership with a Mr. Flint, and continued in such business until 1836, when the business was closed,
and both partners came together to the United States. While in
Peru, he corresponded with his brothers, sister, and mother,
remaining in the United States, but the communication was not
frequent, and nothing in his letters referred to a return. Wis
widow, who was examined as a witness on the trial in behalf of her
daughter, then plaintiff, testified that her husband always intended
to return to this country to educate his children; that that object,
and his ill health, were the reasons which induced him to return;
that she was never in the United States, or out of South America,
until she came with him and with their children in 1836-37, and
was never naturalized. The findings of fact by the judge, and
his conclusions of law, so far as they bear upon the question in
controversy, were as follows:"That the plaintiff was born within the United States, and
that the defendant, Maximo M. Ludlam, was born at Lima, Peru,
South America, and was never naturalized as a citizen of the
United States, nor ever qualified as required by law of resident
aliens, to take or hold lands within the state of New York.
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"That Richard L. Ludlam, in the year 1822, voluntarily
expatriated himself from the United States, where he was a
natural-born citizen, for the purpose of becoming a permanent
resident of Lima, and of establishing his permanent domicile
there, and in a few m6nths thereafter did become such permanent
resident in such last-named place, and there established his permanent domicile.
"That in the year 1828, he there married a natural-born citizen
of Chili, who never became a citizen of the United States, and of
that marriage the plaintiff and said Maximo were born, as afore
stated."
And, as conclusions of law upon the facts so found, the Justice
determined:"1That the plaintiff is a natural-born citizen of the United
States.
"tThat the defendant, Maximo M. Ludlam, is not a naturaltorn citizen of the United States, but at the time of the death of
his uncle, Thomas R. Ludram, was an alien, incapable by law of
taking land or real estate within the state of New York.
"That the lands and real estate mentioned in the complaint,
and whereof Thomas R. Ludlam died seised, upon his death
descended, as to one undivided one-sixth part thereof, to the
plaintiff in fee, as the representative of her father, to the exclusion of said defendant, Maximo M. Ludlam, and that the plaintiff
is entitled to the whole of the proceeds thereof," &c.
The defendant, Maximo M. Ludlam, excepted to the several
conclusions of fact and law above stated.
Judgment was entered in accordance with those findings, and
Maximo M. Ludlam appealed to the Supreme Court, at general
term, when the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered:
81 Barb. 486. From that judgment the plaintiff brought this
appeal, stipulating that final judgment be entered against her, in
case the judgment of the general term shall be affirmed.
John K. Porter, for the appellant.
Daniel Lord, for the respondent.
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SELDEN, J.-Our statute concerning tenures provides that
"every citizen of the United States is capable of holding lands
within this state, and of taking the same by descent, devise, or
purchase:" 1 R. S. 719, § 8. Aliens can neither take nor hold
such lands, except under certain conditions not claimed to exist
here: Id. f§ 15, 16, 17.
The question, who are citizens of the United States, must
depend upon the laws of the United States. In 1790, Congress
passed an act declaring that "the children of citizens of the
United States that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the
limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural-born
citizens :" 1 U. S. Stat. at Large 103. In 1795, the following
provision was substituted for that previously existing, viz.-: "The
children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits
and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as
citizens of the United States :" 1 U. S. Stat. at Large 445, §§ 8,
4. In 1802, Congress repealed the law of 1795, and enacted that
"The children of persons who now are or have been citizens of the
United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States, be considered as citizens of the- United
States." This provision continued unchanged until 1855, when
an act was passed declaring both the wife and children, in a case
Stat. at Large 604.
like the present, to be citizens: 10
As the Act of 1802 did not embrace the children of those who
might thereafter become citizens, and as the father of the defendant, Maximo Ludlam, was born after 1802, and died before 1855,
this case does not come within the provisions of any of the statutes
of the United States on the subject. The same question is prevs. Olarc,
sented, therefore, in this respect which arose in Lynch&
shown
clearly
very
I
think,
1 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 583, where it is,
that in the absence of any statute, or any decisions of our own
courts, state or national, on the subject, the question of citizenship can only be determined by reference to the English common
law, which, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
United States, was, to a greater or less extent, recognised as the
law of all the states by which that Constitution was adopted.
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This conclusion does not involve the question very earnestly
debated soon after the organization of the government, whether
the common law of England became the law of the Federal Gov-.
ernment on the adoption of the Constitution: 1 Tucker's Blackstone, appendix E. p. 378; 1 Story's Cor. on the Const., § 158,
and note 2; Madison's Rep. to the Virginia Legislature, 1799,
1800; Instructions of Virginia to her Senators in Congress, January, 180a; Speech of Mr. Bayard on the Judiciary, 2 Benton's
Debates 616; 1 Kent's Com. 331, 343. It only assumes, what
has always been conceded, that the common law may properly be
resorted: to in determining the meaning of the terms used in the
Constitution, where that instrument itself does not define them.
Judge Tucker, at the close of his essay against the common law
powers of the Federal Government, says: "We may fairly infer,
from all that has been said, that the common law of England
stands precisely upon the same footing in the Federal Government
and the courts of the United States, as such, as the civil and ecelesiastical laws stand upon in England, that is to say, its maxims
and rules of proceeding are to be adhered to, whenever the written
law is8ilent, in cases of similar or analogous nature:" 1 Tucker's
Blackstone, app. E., p. 429. The Legislature of Virginia, in its
instructions to the senators of that state, in. Congress, in January,
1800, directing them "to oppose the passage of any law founded
on or recognising the principle that the common law of England
is in force under the government of the United States," expressly
excepted "from such opposition, such particular parts of the common law as may have a sanction from the Constitution, so far as
they are necessarily comprehended in the technical phrases which
express the powers delegated to the government." The Constitution uses repeatedly the terms, "citizen of the United States,"
but does not define them. Our statute, above referred to, uses
the same terms, and also leaves them undefined. It becomes necessary for the court to decide whether the defendant, Maximo M.
Ludlam, under the circumstances of his birth and life, is a citizen
of the United States within those terms. No case, so far as we
are informed, presenting a similar question, has ever been before
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the courts in this country, state or national, and we are compelled,
therefore, to exercise an arbitrary discretion, or to resort for precedents and information to English writers, and the decisions of
English courts.
The question presented here having been definitely disposed of,
so far as related to England, by Act of Parliament in the 7th
year of Queen Anne, if not as early as the 25th of Edward III.,
no decisions on that subject since the earliest of those dates, of
the courts of that country, based exclusively upon the prior common law, are to be found; and it is only by resorting to a more
remote period in the history of the common law that we obtain
any light to guide us to a decision of that question.
It seems to have been adjudged by the Court of King's Bench,
as early as 7.Edw. Ill., that the children of British subjects in the
service of the king, though born beyond the sea, were capable of
inheriting; and this was confirmed by Parliament in the seventeenth year of the same reign: Dyer 224 a, note 29. An effort
was made at the same Parliament to obtain a further declaration
or enactment on the subject, which failed, but was renewed a few
years afterwards, when the statute of 25 Edw. III., ch. 2, was
passed, which, among other things, provides that children,
"which hencefqrth shall be born out of liegeance of the king,
-whosefathersand mothers, at the time of their birth, be and shall
be, at the faith and liegeance of the King of England, shall have
and enjoy the same benefit and advantage, to have and bear inheritance within the same liegeance as the other inheritors aforesaid in time to come, so also that the mothers of such children
passed the sea by the license and will of their husbands."
It is essential to our present inquiry to ascertain whether this
statute was introductory of a new rule, or simply declaratory of
the previous law. There are considerations of weight on both
sides of this question. The preamble shows that the act was
passed to complete what was left undone by the previous Parliament in 17 Edw. III., and the action of the latter Parliament was
purely declaratory, as it simply confirmed what had been decided
by the King's Bench ten years before. It also shows that the
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application to both parliaments was for the purpose of resolving
a "doubt," and that the king, in order that the law on the subject
be "declared and put in certain," caused Parliament "to delibe.
rate" upon this doubt. The application to Parliament was by
"petition,'.' and of course came from the people; and it is well
known how tenaciously the people of England at that day adhered
to the rules of the common law, and how unwilling they were that
Parliament should change them. It seems clear to me, therefore,
that what was desired and expected from Parliament at this time
was not any new law, but simply a declaration removing the
doubts which obtained as to the existing law.
On the other hand, the terms of the statute would seem to imply
that the introduction of a new rule was intended. It is limited
to children " h enceforth'" to be born, and provides for their inheritance "in time to come." It not unfrequently happens,
however, that statutes are passed in language importing a new
-enactment, which afterwards prove to be merely confirmatory of
the prior law. It is perhaps not easy to determine, therefore,
from the statute itself, taken in connection with its history,
whether it was in truth an enabling or a declaratory act. Principles, however, have, since the statute, been thoroughly settled,
which, in my view, are decisive of the question.
The subject of alienage was very elaborately examined in Calviln's Case, 7 Coke 1, 6 James I. Among the principles settled
in that case, and which have remained unquestioned since, are
these:1. That natural allegiance does not depend upon locality or
place; that it is purely mental in its nature, and cannot therefore
be confined within any certain boundaries; or, to use the language
of Coke, that "liegeance, and faith and truth, which are her
members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man,
and cannot be circumscribed within the predicament of ubi:"
p. 76.
2. That it is -not sufficient, in a plea of alienage, to aver that
the plaintiff was born out of the kingdom, or out of the jurisdiction of the king, but every such plea must aver that the plaintiff
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's not of the allegiance of the king; and judgment was given for
the plaintiff in Calvin's Case, "for that the plea in this case doth
not refer faith or liegeance to the king indefinitely and generally,
but limiteth and restraineth faith and liegeance to the kingdom :"
Id. p. 10 a.
3. That allegiance and protection (i. e. the- rights and the
duties of citizenship) are reciprocal, the one being the considera,
tion for the other: Id. p. 6 a.
4. That a British subject, although residing abroad, still owes
allegiance to the King of England.
It'seems to me to result of necessity from these principles that
the children of English parents, though born abroad, are, nevertheless, regarded by the common law as natural-born citizens of
England. The decision upon the plea in Calvin's Case, which was
merely repeating what was decided in Cobbledilce'8 Case as early
as the reign of Edw. I. (see Calvin's Case, p. 9 b), necessarily
implies that a child may owe allegiance to the king (i. e., not merely
local or temporary, but natural and permanent allegiance), although
born out of the king's dominions; and also that this was a broad
general rule, not confined to a few exceptional cases, because, if
it was an exception, the plea could not have been held bad on
demurrer, as it was in both Cobbledike's and Calvin's Cases; but
the exception must have been pleaded.
Now, upon what ground can allegiance in such cases be claimed?
If natural allegiance, or allegiance by birth, does not depend upon
boundaries or place, as Calvin's Case asserts, upon what does it
depend? There can be but one answer to the question. It is
impossible to suggest any other ground for the obligation than
that of parentage. It must, I apprehend, be transmitted from
the parents to the child, or it could not exist. This being then
the nature of permanent allegiance, it follows that the King of
England may properly claim allegiance from the children of his
subjects, wherever born. If, then, the child of English parents,
though born abroad, is, subditus natus, a born subject of the king,
he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and
citizenship are, as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being
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the consideration of the other. So long, therefore, as the parents
continue to owe allegiance to the Crown of England, so long will
their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born
within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be
entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship.
This conclusion needs no other support than the principles laid
down in Calvin's Case. It is sustained, however, by a remark in
Brooke's Abridgement, title Denizen 6, which is as follows:
".Nota, per HussEy, C. J. If a man be born beyond sea whose
father and mother are English, he should be inheritable before the
statute, but the statute makes this clear." This opinion of HussEY is in no manner weakened by the case of Hyde vs. Bill, Cro.
Eliz. 8,where it is said to have been held upon evidence that ",if
baron and feme, English, go beyond sea without license, or tarry
there after the time limited by the license, and have issue, that the
issue is an alien, and not inheritable, contrary to the opinion, of
HUssEY," because it is plainly implied in this, that if the parents
were abroad, with license, their issue would inherit. The not being
inheritable, therefore, was a penalty for the supposed offence of
going abroad without license. When it came to be held, as it was
later in the reign of Elizabeth (Dyer 296 a), and has been ever
since, that it was not an offence to depart the kingdom without
license, the penalty of course did not attach. What is meant by
the words "1contrary to the opinion of HussEy," does not distinctly appear. The case as it is stated tends, impliedly, to support the note in Brooke. The court mtist hav e had in view the
common law, as the statute was not mentioned, and has nothing
to do with .the question of license. The right to go abroad, without license, appears to have been secured to the subject by the
.Magna Mh arta of King John; and how a license could afterwards
have been supposed necessary, it is not easy to discover. The
language is, "It shall be lawful, henceforth, for any one to go
out of our kingdom and return, safely and securely, by land or
by water, saving his allegianceto us, unless in time of war, by
some short space, for the good of the kingdom :'"Ch. 49. Much
more might be urged, but enough has, I think, been said to make
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i.' ;uite clear, both upon principle and authority, that the Statute

of 25 Edward II.was merely declaratory of the common law.
The reasoning here adopted is intended only to apply to cases
'where the fathers and mothers were natural-born subjects of the
King of England.
We have next to inquire what was the rule of the common law
in respect to children born abroad, when the father was a subject
and the mother an alien. The earliest direct authority on this
subject, to which we have been referred, is from Brooke's Abridgment, title Denizen 21, where it is said, that "if an Englishman
pass the sea and marry an alien woman, by this the wife is of the
king's allegiance, and the issue will inherit," for which reference
is made to the Abridgment, of Assizes. That the author speaks
here of the common law, and not of the statute, is plain from the
reason he gives, viz., that the wife owes allegiance in consequence
of her marriage.
The question was very ably discussed in the case of Rez vs.
.Enton, Litt. 23. An Englishman residing in Poland, as a-merchant, married a Polish woman, and had children born there, and
the question was, whether they were aliens. It was held that
they were not. Several of the judges, it would seem,-who, or
how many does not appear,-held that the words "fathers and
mothers," in 25 Edw. III., should be taken distributively, and to
mean fathers or mothers. This ground, however, was not taken
by the counsel who argued the case. He cited Bracton and Fleta
in support of the position that, by the common law, where both
father and mother were English, their children, born abroad, were
not aliens, and argued that it could mjake no difference, though
the mother were alien, as it was a settled maxim of the common
law that the issue follows the condition of the father.
We have the opinion of Lord HALE upon this question, in-Oo7lingwood vs. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 422. He says: "Although an
English man marry an alien beyond the seas, and having there
issue, the issue will be denizens, as hath been often resolved;" and

that he put this upon the common law ground, that the issue take
the condition of the father, without regard to that of the mother,
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and not upon the Statute of Edw. III., appears from what fol.
lows, for he continues: "Yet it is without question, that if an
English woman go beyond the seas, and marry an alien, and have
issue born beyond the seas, the issue are aliens, for the wife was
sub pote8tate viri."
The opinion of Judge JENKINS was the same, as appears by the
following case, put by him in his reports: "A merchant, trading
in a foreign country, marries an alien there, and has issue by
her born there, this issue shall be heir to his father, although his
mother was not an English woman. Otherwise of an ambassador, for.the business of a merchant requires a long abode abroad,
if he will not trust his whole fortune to factors; it is not so of an
ambassador, it is not his profession :" 1 Jenk. Cent. ease 2. This
distinction between a merchant and an ambassador, and the reason given for it, show conclusively that he put the case upon the
common law, and not upon the statute, because, under the statute,
no such distinction could be made.
These opinions are confirmed by that of the Court of King's
Bench, in the case of Bacon vs. Bacon, Cro. Car. 601. There,
children born in Poland were held not to be aliens. It is true,
the father and mother in that case were both English, but the
court said it would make no difference, though the mother were
an alien. This was not put, as I understand the case, solely upon
the statute by any of the judges. As the case before them came
directly within the terms of the statute, it was natural that they
should refer to it. But they seem to place their decision as much
upon the common law as the statute. Their language is, "he
being an English merchant, and residing there for merchandising,
his children shall, by the common law; or rather, as BERKELEY
said, by the statute of 25 Edward III., be accounted the king's
lieges, as their father is." From this alone we might not be able
to determine what the judged thought as to the common law. But
they also say that it would not be material though the wife were
an alien, for which they give this reason, viz., that she is "8ub
potestate vyri, and quasiunder the allegiance of the king." This
can have no reference to the statute. It is the common law argu-
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ment upon the subject, and shows clearly the opinion of the judges
to be that the common law went further than the statute, and denizenized the children in all cases where the father was a naturalborn subject.
I suppose the doctrine that children, if legitimate, follow in
regard to their political rights and duties, the condition of their
fathers, to be founded in natural law, and to be substantially the
same in most if not all civilized countries. Vattel says, "Society
not being able to subsist and perpetuate itself but by the children
of its citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of
their fathers, and succeed to all their rights:" B. 1, ch. 19, § 212.
In a subsequent section the same author says: "Tt is asked
whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are
citizens? The laws, have decided this question in several countries, and it is necessary to follow their regulations. By the law
of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and
enter into all 'their rights. The place of birth produces no change
in this particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for
taking from. a child what nature has given him. I say of itself,
for the civil law or politics may order otherwise from particular
views:" Id. § 215. It is shown by Vice-Chancellor SANDFORD,
in Lynch vs. Ulark, 1 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 583, 675, that the law of
France, Spain, and Portugal, is in accordance with this doctrine,
by express enactment it is true, as it is now in England and in
this country. But the uniformity goes to show that it is founded
upon a law of nature, and of course prevails in every country,
unless, as Vattel says, it is changed by the municipal law "from
particular views."
The case of Duroure vs. "ones, 4 T. R. 300, is cited in opposi.
tion to these views. The question principally discussed in that
case was upon the construction of the statute of Edw. III-, and
not whether it was declaratory of the common law. It must be
conceded, however, that the judges would seem to have assumed
that it was an enabling act, and introductory of a new rule. It
is also true that Blackstone and Chitty appear to have been of
the same opinion. But neither the judges in that case, nor these
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elementary writers, appear to have discussed the question upon
principle, or to have dwelt upon the authorities which have been
referred to here. Indeed there was no occasion for them to do
so, the question having been disposed of in England by the statute.
Chancellor KENT has examined the subject with more care, and
although he expresses no decided opinion upon the question which
I have considered, yet it may fairly be inferred from what he
says, that in his opinion children born abroad, under such circumstances as attended the birth of Maximo Ludlam, might establish
their citizenship by reference to the principles of the common
law, notwithstanding he speaks of those principles as "dormant
and doubtful :" 2 Com. 50, 53.
The correctness of this intimation of Chancellor KEXT'iS controverted in an able article on the "subject, published in 1854, in
2 Am. Law Reg. 193, attributed to Mr. Horace Binney (Brightly's
Dig. 182), which doubtless induced the passage of the Act of Congress of 1855, that act following literally
its recommendations.
By inducing the removal by Congress for the future, of all doubt
upon a question of such importance, that article has proved useful; but if it should have the effect, in regard to antecedent cases,
to establish the position with which it commences, that all the
children of American families "born in a foreign country are
aliens," a vast balance of evil would be chargeable to its account.
All the cases which the author cites to sustain his position have
been above referred to, and after a careful examination of them,
I am satisfied that they do not sustain his conclusion. Besides,
he does not notice the opinion of Lord HALE in Collingwood vs.
Pace, above referred to, which is directly adverse to his conclusion. If he had examined that opinion, he would not have said
that the case of Rex vs. -Eatonwas overruled by that of .Duroure
vs. Jones, because, upon the ground taken by Lord HALE, the two
decisions are entirely consistent with each other. The injustice
and inconvenience which would often result in the division of
intestates' estates, from the rule that all foreign-born children are
aliens, furnish a strong argument against it, which tends to confirm the inference which I draw from the decided cases.
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Such rule would not only most unjustly interrupt the course of
lescents, but other difficulties not less serious, would result from
its adoption. Our government, in common with every othei
civilized government, extends its protection over its citizens when
in foreign countries, whether merely journeying there, or having
a permanent domicile for purposes of trade: 2 Phil. on Int. Law
4; Halleck on Int. Law, ch. 29, § 4, p. 698. It can hardly be
doubted that it would protect the infant child of such citizen,
though born abroad, to the same extent that it would protect the
father.
Provision was made for the protection of English merchants
residing abroad, by the great charter of King John. Chapters
47 and 48 are as follows: "All merchants shall have safe and
secure conduct to go out of and to come into England, and to
stay there, and to pass, as well by land as by water, to buy and
sell by the ancient and allowed customs, without any extortion,
except in time of war, or when they shall be of any nation at war
with us.
"And if there shall be found any such in our land in the beginning of a "war,they shall be attached, without damage to their
bodies or goods, until it may be known unto us or our chief
justiciary, how our merchants are treated who happen to be in the
country at war with us; and if ours be safe there, theirs shall be
*safe in our hands." Chapter 30 of the great charter of Henry

III. is to the same effect: 2 Inst. 57. Would not the persons
who might be seized in England under these provisions, as hostages for the good treatment of English merchants by the hostile
country, be held also as security for like treatment to the children
of such merchants, though born abroad ? It will hardly be questioned that protection would be thus extended.
An officer in command of one of our vessels of war was fully
justified by our government in obtaining, by an exhibition of
force, the surrender from an Austrian frigate of Martin Koszta,
a natural-born citizen of Austria, claiming the rights of naturalization here, who had been forcibly and wrongfully seized in
Smyrna, and taken on board the frigate. Can it be doubted that
VnL. XII.-39
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the same protection would have been extended to a minor child
of Koszta, if he had been seized with his father, though born in
Austria? The rule which we are asked to sanction would compel
the government, in all such cases, to distinguish between father
and child, extending its protection to the father, and denying it
to the child.
The domicile of the minor child is always that of the father
during his life (Westlake on Priv. Int. Law 35, 5 Ves. 750, 787),
and I think the same rule applies in regard to citizenship; that
the citizenship of the father is that of the child, so far as the laws
of the country of which the father is a citizen are concerned; but
the child, from the circumstances of his birth in a country where
the father is not a citizen, may acquire rights, and be subject to
duties in regard to such country, which do not attach to the
father.
It does not militate against this position, that by the law of
England the children of alien parents, born within the kingdom,
are held to be citizens. There are many instances of double
allegiance; as for instance, one may owe a natural and permanent
allegiance to the country of his birth, and a local and temporary
allegiance to the country in which he resides: Sherley's Case,
Dyer 144 a. Other cases will be referred to hereafter. So, as I
suppose, a child may be in a position which will enable him to
elect, when he becomes of age, of which of two countries he ill
become a permanent citizen. Indeed the argument of the appellant's counsel here goes much further than that, and assumes that
every adult citizen has that right. I do not apprehend that if a
child, born in England of alien parents, should, before arriving at
manhood, return to and become a permanent resident of the country to which his parents belonged, without any intention of ever
returning to England, or of claiming any rights as a natural-born
citizen of that country, he would still be claimed as a subject of
the British Crown, and indictable for the crime of treason if he
should take up arms against that country. Mr. Westlake says,
speaking of the rule "which would impose the duty of allegianz:e
on all those born inter quatuor maria," "We cannot believe that
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it was ever so strictly carried out, as that if a son was born in
England to a foreign merchant, such son, on being afterwvards
taken in arms, a case one would imagine of no infrequent occurrence, should have been hung, drawn, and quartered as a traitor :"
Pr. Int. Law, ch. 2, § 12; Opinion of Northey, Attorney-General,
in the Case of Gillingham, Chalmer's Colonial Opinions 645.
Thus far the case has been considered rather with reference to
the evidence given on the trial, than to the conclusions drawn by
the court from that evidence. This court is bound by the report
of the judge before whom the trial was had, in regard to the facts
so far as they are found by him, excepting that where there is
any doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of such report, the
evidence may be referred to in aid of the report: 19 N. T. 210;
21 Id. 550. Among the facts found by the court are the following, viz.: "That Richard L. Ludlam, the father of the said
Maximo M. Ludlam, and of the plaintiff, in the latter part of the
year 1822, voluntarily expatriated himself from the United States,
where he was a natural-born citizen, for the purpose of becoming
a permanent resident of Lima, in Peru, South America, and of
establishing his permanent domicile there, and in a few months
thereafter, did become such permanent resident in such lastnamed place, and there established his permanent domicile."
It becomes necessary for us to ascertain the meaning and determine the effect of this statement, and especially of that part of it
which relates to expatriation. Webster's definition of the term
"expatriate" is as follows: "In a general sense, to banish. To
expatriate one's self, is to quit one's country, renouncing citizenship and allegiance in that country, to take residence and become
a citizen in another country. The right to expatriate one's 8elf is
denied in feudal countries, and much controverted in the United
States." Worcester's definition is, "To banish from one's native
country; to remove from one's countr3 ." Expatriation, "Act of
expatriating; banishment; emigration."
There is nothing in the evidence to warrant the inference that
Richard L. Ludlam, in leaving the United States, intended to
renounce his allegiance to this country, or to become a citizen of
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Peru, or of any other country. If it were necessary to-decide'
the question, I should be of opinion that the terms " expatriated
himself," as used by the court at special term, were not intended
to express the idea of a renunciation of allegiance or citizenship,
on the part of Richard L. Ludlam, but only a change of domicile,
for the purpose of permanently engaging in business in the foreign
country, with only such change of his relations to his native
country as the laws of nations accord to such change of domicile.
The repeated use of the word " domicile," in the report, which
relates to residence only and not to citizenship, would strongly
favor this construction.
Assuming, however, that we are to understand, from the finding
of the court, that Richard L. Ludlam intended to renounce allegiance to his native country, and to become a citizen of Peru,
that intention has never been carried into effect so as to divest
him of his character as a citizen of the United States. The right
of expatriation, on the part of citizens of the United States, without the consent of the government, has never been recognised by
the courts of this country, or by any of the writers upon public
law. Chancellor KENT, after giving a very careful review of the
decisions on the subject, says: 1 The better opinion would seem
to be, that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United
'States, without the permission of government to be declared by
law; and that, as there is no existing regulation in the case, the
rule.of the English common law remains unaltered :" 2 Kent's
Com. 49, and note a; Halleck's Int. Law, ch. 29, § 8. Whether
this statement of the law is to be considered as in all respects
correct, may perhaps admit of doubt, as some courts and statesmen have been disposed to regard thq right :f expatriation as
6existing where the government has taken no steps to prohibit or
limit it. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has so decided, and
that decision was approved by Attorney-General Cushing; and
General Cass, when secretary of state, went so far as to deny the
right of governments to prohibit expatriation, except where the
act of expatriation, if recognised, would deprive the government
of the power to punish the citizen or subject for an offence pre-

viously committed: Halleck's Int. Law, ch. 29, § 4.
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But none of the opinions go so far as to say that a citizen of
any country can, by any act of his own, divest himself of such
citizenship, until he becomes a citizen of another government:
9 Mass. 461. Chief Justice ROBERTSON, delivering the opinion
of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case before referred
to (9 Dana 178), says: "The government, for the purpose of preventing abuse, and securing the public welfare, may regulate the
mode of expatriation. But where it has not prescribed any limitation on this right, and the citizen has, in good faith, abjured his
country, and become a citizen or subject of a foreign nation, he
should, as to his native government, be considered as denationalized :" Halleck's Int. Law, supra; 1 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 657. General Cass says: "The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized,his
allegiance to his native country is severed for ever. He experiences a new political birth, a broad and impassable line separates
him from his native country: Halleck, ch. 29, § 4. Westlake, in
his treatise before cited, says: "Change of nationality involves
two points, the acquisition of a new national character, and the
loss of the old:" Id. 19, §20.
I cannot fully concur in the opinion expressed by the Courtof
Appeals of Kentucky, and by Secretary Cass, that a citizen has
a right to renounce his allegiance at pleasure. The argument of
Mr. Rutherforth against the propriety of that doctrine possesses
much force. He says: "If each individual was at liberty to leave
the state to which he belongs whenever he pleases, civil society
would be nothing but a rope of sand; it would be impossible for
a common good to be effectually promoted, or for a common mischief to be effectually guarded against. Every member of the
society would be at liberty either to continue in it, and endeavor
to advance the general interest, or to leave it in order to advance a
separate interest of his own. And in times of public distress,
whoever could shift for himself would be at liberty to do so, though
lie left the other members of the society to perish for want of his
assistance. But the great end of forming civil societies is to promote a common good, and to guard against a common mischief.
Certainly, therefore, the nature of civil society can never allow
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such a liberty as this to its members, because it is inconsistentwtth
the end which a civil society proposes to it8elf:" B. 2, ch. 2, § T.
Without, however, pursuing this subject further, it is sufficient
for the present case that all writers, including those who would
give the greatest license to the citizen in the exercise of the power
of expatriation, agree that no person casts off his allegiance to
his native country before he becomes a citizen or subject of another country; and as Richard L. Ludlam, whatever may hive
been the intention with which he left his native country, did not,
so far as the case shows, become a citizen of any other country,
he remained a citizen of the United States during all the time of
his residence in Peru.
There is, in the present case, a narrower and more technical
ground, which, so far as the intention with which Mr. Ludlam left
the Unite& States bears upon the question of his citizenship, leads
to the same conclusion. When he left this country, and is found
by the report to have "expatriated himself," he was but eighteen
years of age, and therefore totally incapable of making any election in regard to his citizenship (26 Wend. 625), and the case is
silent as to any later resolution by him on the subject. He has
at all times, therefore, remained an American citizen, and, according to the established rule of the common law, partus sequitur
patrem, communicated that character to his children born in
Peru.
If we assume that the laws of Peru are similar to ours on the
subject of citizenship, there is no doubt that Maximo Ludlam
would be. in that country, regarded as a citizen of Peru: I Sandf.
Chan. 583. This would involve him, according to the rules which
I find established, in a double allegiauce to this country and to
Peru; and it cannot be denied that inconveniences might result
from such a condition. The case, however, is not new, and I am
not aware that any practical inconvenience has ever resulted to
persons occupying such positions; their immunity in this respect
resulting mainly, it may be presumed,, from the liberality of civilized governments toward persons thus situated. Many persons
were placed in that position by the treaty of peace between this
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country and Great Britain, at the termination of the war waged
to secure our independence, and the subject has been often dis'ussed: Ain8lie vs. Martin, 9 Mass. 460; 2 Kent's Com. 50. In
an opinion written in 1808 by Mr. Reeve, author of the History
of the English Law, it is said: "As to the anomaly and inconsistency of Americans being citizens of the United States while
there, and being British-born subjects when here, this is nt "a
novelty, nor is it peculiar to Americans. It may happen to ally
British subject, and it is allowable in our law, which recognises
this double character of a person being, as was before shown, ad
fidem utriusque regis. British subjects may voluntarily put themselves in such a situation; it is a part of the privileges of a British
subject to be at liberty to do so. Have we not British subjects
who are naturalized in Holland, in Russia, in Hamburg, in various places on the continent of Europe? Do not British subjects
become citizens of the United States? Some persons are born to
such double character; children and grandchildi en, born of British
parents in foreign countries, are British-born subjects; yet these,
no doubt, by the laws of the respective foreign countries, are also
deemed natural-born subjects there. I am aware of the difficulties
which such persons may labor under with these double claims of
allegiance upon them. Such difficulties must be got through, as
circumstances will allow, and consideration should be had for the
parties according to their respective situations, more especiallywith a distinction between those who brought themselves into such
embarrassing situation voluntarily, and those who were born in
it:" * * "These are inconveniences in the way of full exercise
and enjoyment of the rights in question, but detract nothing from
the rights themselves. On the one hand, the king cannot reckon
upon the full and absolute obedience of such persons, because they
owe another fealty besides that due to him; on the other hand,
the subject cannot have full enjoyment of his British rights :"
Chalmer's Colonial Opinions 702, 703; Westlake's Pr. Int. Law,
p. 10, § 12; p. 20, § 22; 18 State Trials 857.
It is no part of my object to show how the difficulties growing
out of the double allegiance to which, upon my theory, Maximo
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Ludlam may ne subject, are to be surmounted; it is sufficient for
my present purpose to show that there is nothing in the fact of
such double allegiance to which my conclusion subjects him to
demonstrate that such conclusion is unsound. No such difficulty
would be likely to arige during his minority, and, on his arriving
at maturity, he would have the right to elect one allegiance and
repudiate the other, and such election would be conclusive upon
him, and would doubtless be respected by the governments.
However this may be, the inconveniences of such double allegi3nce are rather theoretical than real. Practically the person so
situated secures all the rights of citizenship, or at least the right
of inheritance in two countries, and discharges the duties of allegiance in only one. The balance of advantages is decidedly in
his favor: Halleck, ch. 29, § 4.
I am therefore of opinion that Maximo Ludlam was an American citizen at the time of the decease of his uncle, and is entitled
to share equally with his sister in the proceeds of the lands of
which their uncle was seised at the time of his decease.
The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
All the judges concurring,
Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court of Vermont, in Chancery, Rutland County.
MILLER AND

KNAPP, TRUSTEES, ETC.,

Vs. THE RUTLAND AND

WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY.
A railroad company being in want of funds to build its road, authorized its president to issue bonds secured by a mortgage on the road and its franchises. The
president executed an instrument reciting his authority, and proceeding in his
name as president to mortgage the road, &c., but he signed the instrument in his
own name simply., Afterwards, the company issued two sets of bonds, secured
by second and third mortgages in due form. The first bonds not having been
paid when due, the trustees filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage, and thereupon
it was Held, that

MILLER vs. RAILROAD CO.
The corporation had a legal competency to pledge its credit for the procurement
of rails for its road, and to secure payment by a mortgage.
The instrument executed by the president in pursuance of the votes of the directors,
although intended to take effect as the deed of the corporation, yet not being executed by or in the name of the corporation, cannot operate as its deed.
The transaction in a court of equity is to be regarded as an eguitable mortgage, and
thus entitles the complainants, the holders of what was intended to secure the
payment of the first mortgage-bonds, to their full right in equity to the said
mortgage which was intended to be given.
The trustees under the second and third mortgages were the agents of the holders
of bonds under such mortgages, and actual notice to said trustees of the equitable first mortgage, was notice to the bondholders, who therefore took their
bonds subject to all the legal consequences of the existence of the said equitable
first mortgage.
The corporation had sufficient right or interest in the subject-matter of the mortgages upon which said mortgage would lawfully be operative. The corporation
was competent to convey.by mortgage what the mortgage purports to cover and
convey, viz., the road and its franchise, as now construed. The mortgage was
designed to take effect upon the road, as it should exist under the rights of the
corporation, at the time the mortgagees should succeed to its rights by virtue of
the due enforcement of the mortgage.
There is no need of a preliminary decree for the reformation of the deed, and the
court can give immediate effect to the instrument, as if it were reformed in pursuance of a decree of equity. The Court, therefore, grant a decree of foreclosure.

The Rutland and Washington Railroad Company, chartered" in
1847, surveyed and located a railroad pursuant to its charter, and
put it under contract for its entire completion, including land
damages.
The contractors were to receive in payment shares of the capital
stock at par, for all but $100,000, which sum was to be in money.
They proceeded with the work, and when it became necessary to
procure rails, it was found that the capital stock could not be made
productive of the necessary means.
Thereupon the directors voted to modify the contracts by making provision for the issue of $250,000 of bonds, for the purpose
of procuring the necessary iron, to be secured by mortgage upon
the road and its franchises; which bonds the contractors might
receive by substitution for an equal amount of stock; it having
been ascertained by the officers of the company that such bonds
would be received by the dealers in payment for the iron; and
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one of the directors, as agent of the contractors, negotiated the
purchase.
Bonds were issued accordingly; pursuant to votes of May 3d,
1850, May 4th, 1850, and June 25th, 1850.
Subsequent to this, December 10th, 1852, the corporation issued
$550,000 of other bonds, and secured them by a mortgage upon
the road and franchises and property belonging to it. $250,000
of which were designed by the parties to the transaction, to be
used in retiring the first mortgage, and the residue to paying the
other indebtedness of the company. The first mortgage bondholders did not assent to this arrangement in substitution for the
bonds then held by them.
In 1855 the corporation made another mortgage, securing an
issue of $1,300,000 of other bonds; the purpose of which was, by
substituting the new bonds for the former issues, thereby to retire
both the prior mortgages; and also to pay any other existing indebtedness of the company.
Most of the creditors and bond-holders, except those holding
the first mortgage-bonds, came into the arrangement. The holders
of first bonds declined to do so.
The instrument made by Clark in pursuance of the resolutions
of May-4th and June 25th, 1850, recited those votes and proceeded
in the name of Clark as president of the company, and by the
power and authority vested in him by said votes, to grant and
convey; and it is signed by Clark's name without addition or
prefix.
The first mortgage-bonds thus issued and secured, not having
been paid as provided, this suit is brought to enforce the security
by foreclosure.
The cause was argued at the General Term of the Supreme
Court, November. 1862, by Mr. Stoughton of Bellows Falls and
Mr. Stoughton of New York, for the orators; by Judge Bennett
and Mr. Phelps of Burlington, for the defendants; in behalf of
whom also a printed opinion by Judge Redfield of Boston, was
presented.
The cause was held by the Court for advisement till the

MILLER vs. RAILROAD CO.

February Term, 1864, of the Supreme Court in Rutland County,
at which the opinion of the Court was delivered by BARRETT, J.P
It is now to be considered how the rights of the orators stand
in relation to the second and third mortgages.
We assume, for the present, that subsequent grantees take and
hold the estate conveyed, subject, not only to all legal incumbrances to which it was subject in the hands of the grantor, but to
all equitable incumbrances of which they have notice. A case in
point, as propounding and applying the principle is, Sumner vs.
Rkodes, 14 Conn. 184.
The Court are convinced by the evidence, that all the trustees
under the second and third mortgages, prior to and at the time
such mortgages were, executed and they became trustees, had
notice and knowledge, in point of fact, that the first bonds had
been issued, and that the same were secured by. mortgage. Alt
the circumstances and reasonable probabilities concur with the
direct evidence, and leave no reasonable doubt of the fact..
This being so, they stand chargeable with the legitimate effect
of the right, whether legal or equitable, which existed in virtue of
the issuing of the said bonds with such security by way of mortgage as appertained to them; and that too, even though it were
to be held, that the validity of that security depended upon acts
of the corporation prior to the making of said second and third
mortgages, by way of recognising and ratifying the act of the
directors in the transaction constituting the creation of the
security, and even though the trustees under said mortgages had
not, in fact, knowledge of those acts.
When they had notice and knowledge of the issuing and existence of the bonds, and of their being secured by mortgage, if the
fact existed, it had full operation and effect to subject the title
which they took with such notice and knowledge to the legitimate
consequences of that fact.
I [We regret that the great length of the case prevents our giving it in full, but
we take pleasure in laying before our readers that part of Mr. Justice BAR.TT's
very able opinion which discusses the rights of the complainants in relation to the
econd and third mortgages.-EDs. LAW REa.]
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The bonds, immediately upon being issued, having been received
in payment for the rails, thereby became effective in the hands of
the holders, with the fixed right in them to the security provided
in that behalf; and it was not in the power of the corporation or
of any of its officers, without the concurrence of such holders, to
divest or affect that right by any act of theirs thereafter; so that,
whatever was said or done by or in behalf of the corporation,
through its officers, in respect to other bonds and. mortgages as
affecting the rights of the holders of the first bonds, or by way of
making other provisions for the debt evidenced thereby, was entirely nugatory as against the holders of said first bonds.
They stood upon fixed and vested rights, over which the corporation had no control, except by paying said bonds. It makes no
difference, as to the rights of the said bond-holders, what provision was made in this respect, either by means of, or under, the
second or third mortgage, or whether the corporation, or its officers,
acted in good faith or not in making or administering such
provision.
It is now to be considered how such notice and knowledge on
the part of the trustees under the second and third mortgages
affects the title they hold, in view of the relation they sustain to
the bond-holders under said mortgages respectively.
In Piercevs. Emery, 32 N. H., p. 521, Ch. J. PERLEY says:"Notice to trustees, who take a conveyance for the mere purpose
of upholding an estate, without having any previous connection
with the title, is not always, nor perhaps usually, regarded as notice to the ceetui8 que trust. But the trustees under this act must
be considered in the light of agents for the negotiating of the loan;
they act for those who lend their money on the security of the
mortgage; they are charged with the duty of protecting the interests of the bond-holders, who are unconnected individuals, having no ready means of acting together except through the trustees,
whom the law appoints to act for them. Notice to the trustees
would be all that could be given in this case."
It is well settled, as is said in Hill on Trustees 513, that, "Notice, either actual or constructive, will be equally binding, whether
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it be given to the purchaser himself, or to a person acting as his
agent, or solicitor, or counsel."
We think, both upon principle, and from due regard to what
alone is practicable in such cases, that notice to the trustees
should be held to affect the title in their hands with reference to
all rights existing in respect thereto under the trust. Though it
is obvious and readily conceded, that bond-holders acquire their
rights, in reference to the security provided by the mortgage in
trust, by the purchase of the bonds, and with such purchase the
trustees have no connection, nor any agency in reference to the

transfer thereof, yet it is at the same time true, that, in reference
to the security, both for holding, enforcing, and administering it
according to the provisions of the trust, the trustees are the agents
of the parties interested and entitled by reason of being bondholders. We are unable to assent to the proposition, that the
trustees are only agents of the cestui .que trust for holding the
legal title. They are agents for holding just such title as is
created by the deed, and for administering it according to the
terms of the trust; and whatever title the cestuis que trust have,
whether legal or equitable, is through, and in virtue of, the title
conveyed to, and held by, the trustees. Even if it should be
granted that the trustees were agents merely for holding the legal
title, still, as the rights of the eastuis que trust depend upon, and
are to be asserted through that legal title, whatever affdcts such
legal title in its creation in the trustees, must affect the rights and
interests that are dependent upon it.
- If the legal title is charged with an incumbrance in its creation
in the hands of the trustees, it is difficult to see how the. eastui8
que trust can have an equity suspended upon that legal title that
shall override such incumbrance.
However that might be as a proposition applicable to a dry trust,
still, as to a trust, which, in addition to the holding of' the title, is
administrative of the property for the purpose of effectuating the
security, the trustees must be regarded as the agents of the ce8tuis que trust with reference to all their rights and interests, both
in the title held, and in the administration and fruits of the trust,
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In JturgZ8 & Douglass
vs. Knapp et als., 31 Vt. 84, it was held that a mortgage by a
railroad company, where the only trust expressed was, to hold the
property to secure the payment of the bonds named, created an
active, administrative trust, even after a foreclosure, under which
the trustees were authorized to make a lease of the road and property for ten years, against the protest and remonstrance of a
large majority in amount of the bond-holders.; though contrary to
my own opinion. But it is the adjudicated law of the subject in this
State. In the present case, however, the second and third mortgages provide specifically, and in detail, for the administration of
the property, after the condition shall have been broken, for the
satisfaction of the rights and interests of the bond-holders under
said mortgages.
The fact, that the bonds are treatedi as negotiable, and pass from
hand to hand like bank bills, does not affect the question of the
agency of the trustees in reference to the security provided by the
mortgage.
Such bonds purport to be secured by a mortgage in trust to
trustees who are designated and known. They are negotiated and
purchased upon the security thus existing. That security consists
in the property and title which exist in the trustees. By the purchase of the bonds, the purchaser voluntarily adopts the security
as it exists in the trustees, and becomes cestui que trust under
them, thereby adopting said trustees as his agents for holding the
existing title, and administering the property held thereby to the
intents specified in the creation of the trust.
The -question is not as to how cestuis que trust would be affected
by notice to trustees of transactions sub.sequent to the creation of
the trust, or to their becoming cestuis under the trust, but as to
how they are affected by notice to the trustees which- as to them
personally, affects the legal estate at the time, and in the act of
their becoming trustees.
Then as to the practicableness of a contrary doctrine :-The
very fact that the bonds pass from hand to hand, and without any
record or notice, and are changing hands every day to a greater
according to its terms and legal operation.

MILLER vs. RAILROAD CO.

or less extent, shows that the matter of fixing an equity by notice
would be practically impossible.
It cannot be known in whose hands all, or any considerable portion of the bonds are at any given time, nor in whose hands they
will be the next day, or next month. Of course notice would
affect only the party to whom it was given, as there is no joint
interest, or representative relation, between the different holders
of the bonds. Nor would notice to a holder of specific bonds today affect a person who, without notice, should, in good faith, be
the holder of the same bonds to-morrow.
The result must necessarily be, that however well grounded an
equity a party might have against the corporation, and against
the trustees personally, attaching upon the legal title held by such
trustees, it would prove barren and futile to any beneficial intent.
by reason of the impossibility of knowing and notifying the ever
shifting parties who have an interest, and claim an equity, subsequently created and subsequently accruing.
On the other hand, it would be easy comparatively for persons,
desirous of investing in railroad mortgage bonds, to apply to the
trustees holding the security, and elicit the true state of the title.
We think it no hardship that they should be required to do so, if
they would avoid. the hazard of finding their security subject to
prior incumbrances, when it might be too late to save themselves
from the consequences of such a state of the title.
The only case that has been cited, or that we have been able to
find, in which a contrary proposition has been asserted, is C(urtis
vg. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. Rep. Several of the judges drew up opinions.
Shankland and Paige concur with Comstock and three other of
the judges in the result, that the bond-holders were entitled to the
,securities in the hands of the trustees,-those two putting it on
the ground that they were bona fide purchasers of the bonds, without notice of the defect in the manner in which the securities had
been assigned to said trustees, one of whom knew of said defect:
holding that the trustees were not agents of the bond-]olders, but
only of the corporation making the assignment.
The four other judges held the assignment itself to be valid, not -
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withstanding such alleged defect in the manner of making it, on
the ground that it being within the scope of the power of the corporation to make such an assignment, and the corporation having
received the benefits resulting from the issue and sale of the
bonds, it had, by its acts of recognition and ratification, cured said
alleged defect.
Judges Shankland and Paige cite no authority upon the point
to sustain their view; and it was not one of the points decided in
the case. The securities assigned were bonds and mortgages. to
be held by the assignees, and the avails to be held and applied as
security and in payment of the bonds issued by the company, in
the manner provided in the instrument of assignment.
We have no occasion to present any critical analysis and discussion of that case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
trustees and bond-holders in that case sustained such a relation to
each other, and to the subject-matter of their respective interests,
as to constitute ground for the application of the same principle
and rule as the case before us. For if it did, upon the views we
have expressed, we should regard the point as held by Judges
Shankland and Paige unsound. But it is sufficient to say that it
was not so decided in that case, and of course stands only upon the
individual views of the judges named.
It is to be noticed, that, in what we have said, as to the trustees
being agents of the bond-holders, we confine that agency to the
purposes of the trust with which the trustees were clothed, viz.:
that of holding the title as security, and enforcing and administering such security according to the provisions of the trust, both express, and by law implied. We do not hold, nor do we assent to
the position taken in the argument by one of the counsel for the
defendants, in reference to the $250,000 of bonds under the second
mortgage, put into the hands of Miller with the design of having
them appropriated to the retirement of the first bonds, that the
trustees have, under their trust, any agency to discharge, change,
or compromise the security which they hold as trustees. They
are not general agents of the bond-holders, but special, and limited
to the legitimate purposes of the relation they sustain to the se-
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curity and to the parties entitled, under the trust with which they
are clothed. Any act or omission of theirs, therefore, whether in
bad or good faith, outside the scope and purposes and legitimate
incidents of the trust, would not affect other parties in their rights
under the trust, on the score of the agency existing in virtue of
that relation.
But it is insisted that the subsequent mortgagees cannot be subjected to the prior equitable incumbrance, unless the notice to
them was such as to make it fraudulent in them to take and register said mortgages, in prejudice to the known title of the other
party.
To the principle embodied in this position we have no difficulty
in assenting; but we think that the impression, naturally resulting from the manner in which it is put, may not be precisely accurate.
The notice, which the law regards as effectual to charge a sub
sequent purchaser, is such as, if duly heeded and properly pursued,
would lead to a knowledge of the true character, in point of fact,
of the prior incumbrance, and thus charges him with the legal
consequences of such prior incumbrance, however he may judge
of the validity, in point of law, of such incumbrance, or of the
legal consequences that may flow from it. By the fact of such
notice, being charged with a knowledge of such incumbrance, if
in fact it existed, the law regards the taking of a subsequent conveyance in prejudice to such incumbrance, as being in badfiith on
the part of the purchaser, even though in truth he took such conveyance, either in heedless disregard of the notice, or upon the
supposition that the prior claim was invalid, or in doubt whether
it was valid or not, and thought best to take his chances in that
respect; and not with any wish or design to defraud anybody.
Indeed the true idea of fraud, as involved in this subject, is not
so much that there is fraudulent intent on the part of the subsequent purchaser in taking the conveyance, as that, to permit it to
be set up and enforced, as against the prior equitable title, would
operate a fraud as against that title. This is the elemental idea
of an estoppel inpais, in its ordinary application; to which, the
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principle, upon which a subsequent purchaser is charged by a
notice of a prior equitable title is strikingly analogous, if not precisely identical with it.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
NORRIS Vs. DONIPHAN.
Nor.-Since the publication of our June number we have received from Mr.
Justice BunLnrr a complaint of some verbal inaccuracies in the copy of his opinion,
from which our report of this case was taken. We therefore subjoin the passages
as corrected by him.-EDs. Am. LAw REa.

"If Congress had the power to enact this statute, it can adopt
such measures as may be necessary to carry it into effect. It is
probable that, in order to carry its provisions into effect, it will
be necessary not only to defeat and disperse the Southern armies
in the field, but to subjugate the people of the Southern States,
and hold them in a condition of permanent subjection to the government of a nominal Union, to be controlled by the people of
the other States, unless they also should lose their liberties in an
effort to subjugate others. It seems certain that the framers of
the Constitution did not mean to clothe Congress with the power
thus to destroy the Government." P. 483.
"We are satisfied that if the statements of this answer are true,
those principles of the common law which suspend an alien enemy's right of action during war, apply to this case, and forbid our
courts from aiding the appellee to recover money which might be
used to support the war against the United States." P. 488.

